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ABSTRACT
DYNAMIC LABOR SUPPLY AND SAVING INCENTIVES UNDER A
PRIVATIZED PENSION SYSTEM: EVIDENCE FROM CHILE
Clement Joubert
Petra Todd
Chile became in 1981 the first country to opt for a pension program based on
privately-managed individual pension accounts. 27 years later, after recognizing
that a large fraction of the workforce was effectively not covered by the individ-
ual capitalization scheme, Chile implemented an important reform that increased
the coverage and generosity of state-financed minimum pension benefits, thereby
expanding the role of the State in the pension system. The purpose of this disserta-
tion is to understand how the design of a privatized pension system with mandatory
pension contributions and a state-financed safety net affects a household’s economic
decisions, in order to investigate the causes of the low coverage rate of the pension
system, and to predict the effects of the 2008 reform. Linked administrative and self-
reported data on employment histories, earnings and savings are used to estimate
a dynamic behavioral model in which a couple faces a labor market composed of a
covered sector, that is subject to mandatory pension contributions, and an uncovered
sector of self-employed and informal jobs. In addition to the pension savings, which
are illiquid until retirement, the couple can save privately in a risk-free asset. The
estimated model is used to determine the extent to which the pension contributions
reduce the pension system’s coverage rate and crowd out private savings. Then, the
expanded safety net implemented by the 2008 reform is introduced into the model
to evaluate ex-ante its potential effects in terms of coverage, saving decisions and
the fiscal cost of the reform.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Increasing life-expectancy and decreasing fertility are causing the world’s population
to age rapidly. The number of working age people (ages 15-64), per person 65 or older
is projected to fall from 9 to 4.1 worldwide by 2050.1 As a result, many traditional
pay-as-you-go pension systems, in which current workers finance current old-age
pensions, are in danger of becoming insolvent. For example, the 2009 update on
the Congressional Budget Office’s long-term projections for Social Security, predicts
that “34 years from now, the Social Security Administration (SSA) will not have
the legal authority to pay full benefits.”2 These dismal projections have fostered a
policy debate that pits incremental reform of existing pension systems, through a
reduction of payments or an increase in payroll taxes, against a more radical change
of paradigm.
Over the last three decades, many countries in Latin America and Eastern
Europe, opted to completely overhaul their pension systems by transitioning to
privately-managed individual accounts systems.3 Chile was one of the earliest coun-
tries to make this transition in 1981, and its pension system strongly influenced the
1World population aging 1950-2050 - United Nations - 1999
2[24]
3For example (year of the reform): Peru (1993), Argentina (1994), Mexico (1997), Hun-
gary(1998), Poland (1999), Bulgaria (2000).
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design of many other countries’ systems. However, 27 years later, after recognizing
that a large fraction of its workforce was effectively not covered by the pension sys-
tem, Chile shifted gears by implementing in 2008 a dramatic expansion of the role
of the State as a retirement benefit provider.
In this paper, I develop and estimate a behavioral dynamic discrete choice model
using Chilean data to empirically assess how the design of a privatized pension
system affects labor market participation, savings accumulation, coverage of the
pension program and the government’s budget. My model describes the decision
process of a couple faced with uncertain earnings and asset returns under the pre-
2008 pension system rules. The couple, modeled as a unitary household, decides
in every period until they retire whether each spouse will work in a covered job,
subject to tax-deferred mandatory pension contributions, an uncovered job or not
at all. The household can also save privately to insure against income fluctuations
or to supplement the pension savings accumulated in the covered sector. I use the
estimated model to simulate changes in the system’s rules.
In particular, I evaluate ex-ante the impact of the major expansion of the system’s
safety net passed in 2008, that provides a good illustration of the tradeoffs faced by
policy makers. Proponents of privatization hoped that a system based on individual
accounts would create smaller labor distortions and improve participation in the
pension system ([5]). However, in Chile the coverage rate of the defined contribution
plan has remained low: the fraction of the labor force that contributes to their
individual pension account at a given point in time was 62% in 2004 ([2]). In the
years preceding the 2008 reform, micro-data on labor histories were used to establish
that a large number of workers go in and out of pension-covered work and fail to
make regular contributions ([1], [3]). Concern over old age poverty among these
low-contribution workers was the major impetus behind the reform. However, as
pointed in [21], a generous safety net can create additional disincentives for pension
contributions. First, by reducing the marginal value of consumption in retirement
2
and second, by imposing an effective marginal tax (EMT) on pension contributions
if these reduce the benefit received by the worker.4 For example, before the 2008
reform, Chile’s safety net was composed of a means-tested welfare pension (pension
asistencial, PASIS) and a minimum pension guarantee (MPG) for individuals with
20 or more years of contributions to their individual pension accounts (see 1.1).
These both took the form of top-ups, so that workers eligible to either benefit faced
an effective marginal tax of 100%, as additional contributions to their account would
not increase the level of their pension.5 The 2008 reform implements a unified safety
net which guarantees a minimum pension level regardless of the number of years of
contribution. For each peso of self-financed pension, the benefit is reduced by 0.3
pesos, lowering the implicit marginal tax rate on pension contributions to about 37%.
However, this gradual reduction can also significantly increase the fiscal burden to
the government.
In addition to analyzing ex-ante the impact of the 2008 reform, I perform a
second policy experiment that assesses the disincentives to participate in the pension
program created by mandatory pension contributions. In Chile, salaried workers are
required to contribute 10% of their wages to their pension account.6 The very low
level of additional voluntary pension contributions above the required level of 10%
suggests that this lower bound on the saving rate is binding for most workers.7 A
higher mandatory contribution rate could increase household savings and reduce the
fiscal cost of the safety net, unless it discourages participation in pension covered jobs
too much. Conversely, a lower contribution rate could improve pension coverage, but
would potentially increase government liabilities.
4The effect of the marginal tax created by minimum pensions on retirement decisions is analyzed
in the context of Spain by [18] and [23].
5In a top-up design, if the level of the pension afforded by the worker’s contributions is below
the minimum pension, the benefit paid by the government is equal to the difference between the
two.
6In addition, 2.6% of administrative fees and disability insurance premium as well as 7% of
contributions to a health insurance scheme are deducted from the payroll.
7Fewer than two percent of pension system members had positive balances in their voluntary
contributions account in 2005.
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Figure 1.1: The 2008 reform of the Chilean pension safety net
In the model, incentives to work in the covered sector are dynamically affected by
labor decisions made in previous periods as spouses endogenously accumulate sector-
specific human capital. The level of accumulated private and pension savings also
influences labor sector choice by changing the marginal value of additional illiquid
pension contributions. In the model, spouses may work in different sectors to qualify
for a minimum pension while at the same time avoiding oversaving. Having one
spouse work in the informal sector can alleviate the reduction of disposable income
resulting from mandatory pension contributions. Another key element of the model
that is needed to accurately capture the impact of pension rules on coverage is the
degree of segmentation between the two labor sectors. My model accounts for the
possibility that the uncovered sector is a residual labor market. Although workers
can always work in the uncovered sector, I allow the probability of receiving a covered
4
job offer to be less than one and to depend on individual characteristics, including
the number of years already worked in the covered sector.8
I estimate the parameters of the earnings offer function, of preferences and of the
probability of receiving a covered job offer using the Method of Simulated Moments
([20]). I use a unique dataset collected for the purpose of analyzing social protection
in Chile, and the pension system in particular. The data is composed of a longitu-
dinal survey (“Encuesta de Proteccion Social” or EPS) linked with administrative
data from the pension system’s regulatory agency.9 The survey data include retro-
spective employment histories, as well as self-reported household labor earnings and
household assets collected in 2002, 2004 and 2006. The administrative data contain
the longitudinal history of pension savings of the respondents since the 1980 pension
reform.
I use my estimated model to perform two policy experiments that evaluate the
impact of pension rules on household savings, participation in the pension system
and fiscal liabilities to the government. First, I perform an ex-ante evaluation of
Chile’s 2008 pension reform. My results suggest a very low projected fiscal cost
for the pre-2008 system, with only about 1.5% of males and 5% of females in the
sample qualifying for the guaranteed minimum pension benefits. The low level of the
minimum pension, the stringent 20 years of contribution eligibility requirement and
the high historical rates of return on Chilean pension funds explain this result. In
contrast, the more generous safety net from the 2008 reform will benefit more than
20% of the sample, be six times as costly to the government and generate a small
reduction in coverage and female labor force participation.
The second experiment changes the mandatory contribution rate from 10% to
values ranging from 5% to 20%. I find that the government can significantly increase
total household savings by increasing the required contribution rate. Faced with
8Uncovered or informal labor markets have been viewed as either residual (i.e. providing low-
paying jobs to workers without access to the formal market) as in [9] or [15] or competitive, as in
[19].
9Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (SAFP).
5
a contribution rate of 15% instead of 10%, households partially offset the higher
mandatory pension contributions by reducing their private savings, but still end
up saving 14% more overall. However, it also lowers pension system coverage by 5
percentage points as people leave the covered sector for the uncovered sector.
1.1 Related Literature
The model incorporates three key mechanisms shown in the literature to be influ-
enced by pension system rules. The first is the choice of portfolio between a taxable,
liquid asset and tax-deferred, illiquid pension savings. How that tradeoff evolves
over the lifecycle as a function of the relative strength of the precautionary and
retirement saving motive has been studied in the context of Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs) ([10], [8], [7]). More recently, [6] and [11], look at the optimal
lifecycle portfolio choice between taxable and tax-deferred accounts, and evaluate
the welfare cost from contributing at a suboptimal rate. A related paper is [17] who
show that the substitution between pension and private wealth can account for the
low savings accumulation observed in a fraction of American households. These pa-
pers take household income as an exogenous process, whereas in my model income
is endogenous due to the labor force participation choices.10 The second mechanism
is the joint labor supply decision made by the spouses. [26] highlight the impor-
tance of allowing for income risk pooling within the household to accurately study
the incentives created by social pension programs.11 The third mechanism is each
spouse’s choice to work in either the covered or the uncovered sector. Agents can
choose not to participate in the pension program altogether by working informally
or as a self-employed worker. [25] uses a two-period general equilibrium model to
analyze theoretically the crowding effects of the safety net on pension contributions
10to keep the model tractable and in light of the extremely low level of voluntary contribution
in the data, I do not allow households to make additional contribution over the 10% mandated by
law.
11Other recent examples include [13], [14], [4].
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under different designs, but does not perform a quantitative analysis. [22] specify
and estimate a dynamic stochastic model, in which agents can save privately and
exert effort to increase their probability of working in the formal sector, to estimate
the potential effect of a large set of social insurance policies in the context of Brasil.
They estimate preference parameters using age-profiles of the fraction of individuals
in the covered, uncovered, unemployed and retired states, but do not use data on
wages, assets, sector-specific experience or longitudinal transitions. [27] also studies
the effect of Chile’s pension rules on the contributions decisions, but looks at male
individuals without allowing for private savings or a joint household labor supply
decision.
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Chapter 2
Overview of the Chilean Pension
System
2.1 The crisis of the old Pay-as-you-go system
Before 1981, Chile had a heterogeneous Social Security system composed of up to 32
different institutions called “Cajas de Prevision”, that covered different professions
and categories of the population. Each specified different contribution and benefit
rules. Originally designed as partially-funded, the system evolved into a pay-as-you-
go program, with a chronic deficit financed by the State that represented 40% of
payments in 1980. Despite repeated attempts at reforms dating back to the fifties,
the financial imbalances of the pension system deteriorated. The system was caught
in a vicious circle by which deficits would lead to higher contributions (over 50%
of a worker’s monthly remuneration in 19741), higher contributions would result in
increased payment evasion (the ratio of active contributors over people in work fell
from 83 in 1973 to 71 in 1980), which accentuated the decline in the Contributors-
to-Pensioners ratio (3.5 in 1973, 2.2 in 1980) and the system’s budget deficit.
1Note that this number refers to a global contribution rate which financed pensions but also
health benefits and industrial accidents, among other things.
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2.2 The Chilean Pension System
On November 4th 1980, Chile created a new Pension System, known as “AFP”2
system. The previous system was reorganized into a unified institution named In-
stitute of Social Security Normalization (INP) which to this day manages the old
system’s pensioners and workers who decided to remain affiliated to the old system.
In order to encourage transfers, workers who opted for the new system received an
increase in net income of 12.6% (which corresponds to the new contribution rate plus
commissions or fees) and the benefits accrued under the old system were recognized
by issuing a “recognition bond” payable upon retirement.
The main component of the new AFP Pension system is a savings program based
on defined-contribution individual accounts. The program is mandatory for salaried
workers and voluntary for the self-employed. Affiliated workers must pay 10% of
their monthly wages in a tax-deferred pension account which is locked until retire-
ment. The contributions are capped at 60 UFs3. In addition to the 10% pension
contribution, workers must pay a contribution of 7% for health services, 0.8% for a
disability and survivorship insurance, and 2.6% to the pension fund manager as a
commision or fee.
The worker can choose from a number of pension fund administrators (the “AFP”s)
who manage the savings deposited on the account and invest them on the financial
markets. The number of AFPs has changed over the years, reaching 32 in 1997 but
was down to 5 in 2008. Initially, AFPs were required to invest all of the funds in
government bonds, but they have gradually been allowed to offer a broader array of
investment choices, including foreign assets and stocks. In addition, since 2002, each
AFP must offer 5 portfolio options, called multifunds, to their affiliates. The funds
are labeled A to E with an increasing weight on fixed-income assets. By default,
older workers are assigned to a more conservative portfolio (D or E).
2AFP: Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, or Pension Funds Administrators
3UFs or Unidades de Fomento are indexed on inflation. The value of the UF as of December
2004 was $17,317 pesos (US$31)
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Workers can access their pension savings at 65 years old for men and 60 years old
for women. They have three withdrawal options: Programmed Withdrawals (Retiro
Programado), purchase an annuity from an insurance company (Renta Vitalicia), or
a mix of phased withdrawals for a period of time and a deferred lifetime annuity. The
law allows for early retirement, provided that the worker can obtain a pension equal
to or greater than 110% of the minimum pension guaranteed by the State4. Before
2008, the state provided retirement income transfers through two mechanisms. A
welfare or assistance pension (pension asistencial or PASIS), equal to about 1/3 of
the minimum wage5 was provided to individuals above 65 years of age, irrespective
of their contribution history, provided that their earnings and their household’s per
capita earnings per capita were both below that level. The second transfer was
a minimum pension guarantee (MPG) equal to about twice the PASIS: individuals
with more than 20 years of contribution would receive the MPG if their accumulated
contributions could not finance a higher pension. Both these benefits took the form
of a top-up: the benefit was equal to the difference between the guaranteed level and
the pension financed by the worker’s account.
2.3 The 2008 Reform of the Safety Net
The analysis of histories of pension contributions at the micro level revealed that
about half of the working population was contributing to the system too little to
finance a minimum pension or to qualify for the State MPG. This led to an over-
haul of the system of minimum pensions paid by the State. The reform also tackled
other problems such as insufficient price competition in the AFP industry or gen-
der equity, but I focus in this work on the reform of the eligibility and level of the
safety-net. The 2008 reform replaced the PASIS and MPG with a “New Solidarity
4The pension must also be equal to or greater than 50% of the average taxable income for the
last 10 working years
5In 2007, the PASIS was 44.186 per month for workers between 65 and 70, 47.103 between 70
and 75, and 51.503 between 75 and 80 (82, 87 and 95 dollars per month respectively).
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Pillar” comprised of a unique means-tested welfare pension which guarantees to all
individuals in the 60% less affluent fraction of the population a pension of 75000
pesos per month.6 This represents an increase of nearly 50% with respect to the PA-
SIS. The main innovation is that instead of constituting a floor pension, the benefits
are gradually reduced, at a rate of 30%, for workers with some accumulated pension
contributions. That is, a worker who can finance a pension of 100000 pesos per
month with the funds accumulated in her individual account will receive a benefit
equal to 75000 -(100000*0.3)=45000. Her total pension will then be 145000 pesos
per month. Before the reform, eligible workers effectively faced an implicit marginal
tax rate of 100%: additional contributions would not increase the level of her pension
at retirement. The means-tested welfare pension also created disincentives for par-
ticipation as workers anticipating to benefit from it would not gain from saving into
the system. The new system ensures that an additional contribution always increase
the level of the retirement pension, and it maintains a constant implicit marginal
tax rate of about 37% on additional contributions.
6The current level is 60000 pesos but will be increased gradually until 2012
11
Chapter 3
The Model
3.1 Description of the Model
The model represents the decision problem of a married or unmarried couple. I use
the husband/wife terminology in both cases for simplicity. The optimization problem
starts when the couple is formed (t = t0). Initial conditions are comprised of work
experiences and schooling levels of both spouses and the household’s assets. A period
corresponds to a calendar year and is indexed by the husband’s age. Spouses are
assumed to remain together until they both die at t = tD.
3.1.1 Decisions
To keep the model tractable, I assume that both spouses claim their pension benefits
and stop working at t = tR. At each working age t ∈ {t0, ...tR − 1}, households
make two decisions: the household consumption decision ct and a joint labor force
participation decision dt = (d
H
t , d
W
t ), where H,W refers to Husband and Wife. Three
employment options are available to spouse j ∈ {H,W}: to work in the covered
sector (djt = 1), to work in the uncovered sector (d
j
t = 2), or to stay home (d
j
t =
3). After retirement, both spouses stay at home (dt = (3, 3)) and only make a
consumption decision.
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3.1.2 Preferences
Couples form a unitary household with a single common period utility function. They
care about total household consumption through a CRRA utility function. They also
care about whether each spouse works or not through non-pecuniary benefits derived
from leisure denoted by δH and δW . Finally, they pay a cost when switching between
covered and uncovered sectors (φHs , φ
W
s ), and when returning to work after a period
at home (φHa ,φ
W
a ). The period utility function is given by:
∀t ∈ {t0, tD},
u(ct, dt) =
c1−σt
1− σ
+ (δH + εHt ) · I{dHt =3}
+ (δW + εWt ) · I{dWt =3}
+ φHs · (I{dHt =1,dHt−1=2} + I{dHt =2,dHt−1=1}) + φ
H
a · I{dHt 6=3,dHt−1=3}
+ φWs · (I{dWt =1,dWt−1=2} + I{dWt =2,dWt−1=1}) + φ
W
a · I{dWt 6=3,dWt−1=3}
where the shocks to the value of leisure are assumed to be distributed normally and
to be uncorrelated over time:
(εHt , ε
W
t ) ∼ iidN(0,Σp)
The model’s state variables are the following: at denotes the household’s non-
retirement or private savings at age t; BHt and B
W
t are the balances on the retirement
accounts of the two spouses at age t; XHU,t, X
W
U,t, X
H
C,t and X
W
C,t are the four stocks
of sector-specific experience, with the subscripts U and C denoting the uncovered
and covered labor sectors. They correspond to the number of years each spouse has
worked in each sector up to period t. EH and EW are the schooling levels of the
spouses. dt−1 is the pair of labor decisions in the previous period. c is the birth
cohort of the husband.
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Lifetime preferences are additively separable over time and can be expressed
recursively as a function of the state variables:
∀t ∈ {t0, tD},
Vt(at, {Bit}i, {Ei}i, {X ij,t}i,j, dt−1; c) =
u(ct, dt) + βEVt+1(at+1, {Bit+1}i, {Ei}i, {X ij,t+1}i,j, dt−1; c)
where i ∈ {H,W} is the spouse-specific subscript, j ∈ {U,C} is the sector-specific
subscript and EVt+1 is the so-called Emax function that gives expected future utility
as a function of current period state variables.
3.1.3 Household Income
Households face a two-sector labor market with a covered and an uncovered sector.
Each spouse may receive a stochastic earnings offer from the covered sector that
depends on her level of schooling, sector-specific experience stocks and the birth
cohort of the husband. Each spouse also receives a stochastic earnings offer from the
uncovered sector with probability 1. The probability Γit for spouse i to receive an
earnings offer from the covered sector in period t is a logistic function of education,
the number of years of covered experience, and having been employed in the covered
sector in the previous period:
∀i ∈ {H,W}, t ∈ {t0, tR},
Γit = (1 + exp{−(γi + γicovI{dit−1=1} + γ
i
EE
i + γiXPX
i
C)})−1
The log-earnings offers (for spouse i ∈ {H,W}, in sector j ∈ {C,U}) are given by:
wij,t = α
i
j + θ
j
c · c+ θiE,j · Ei + θiX,j(E) · (X ij + τ
j
XPX
i
−j) + ε
i
j,t
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where αij is a gender- and sector-specific constant, θ
i
c a sector-specific cohort effect,
θE,j the returns to schooling, θ
i
X,j(E) are the returns to experience, and τ
j
XP ∈
[0, 1] captures the transferability of cross-sector experience. εij,t is an iid sector-
specific earnings offer shock that is uncorrelated accross time-periods and potentially
correlated within a household:
(εij,t)
i=H,W
j=U,C ∼ N(0,Σo)
The total household disposable labor income yt is the sum of accepted earnings offers,
net of contributions:
yt =
∑
i∈{H,W}
((1− τ) · wiC,t · I{dit=1} + w
i
U,t · I{dit=2})
where τ is the pension contribution rate.
Covered labor earnings net of pension contributions and private savings re-
turns are subject to a progressive income tax. Taxes due at period t are denoted
T (at, w
H
C,t, w
W
C,t, dt), and depend on the household’s stock of private savings, received
covered sector offers and decisions to accept them. Net borrowing and borrowing
against pension savings is not allowed. Private savings earn the risk-free rate r. The
balances on each spouse’s pension account accrue interests stochastically and are
augmented by the current period’s contribution. Returns on the pension accounts
are modeled as an iid process: rB ∼ iidN(r̄B, σ2B).1.
1Allowing for serial correlation in the returns would require adding past returns as additional
continuous state variables which would significantly complicate the numerical solution of the prob-
lem
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3.1.4 The Working Household’s Problem
The optimization problem faced by the household at working ages can be written
recursively:
Vt(at, {Bit}i, {Ei}i, {X ij,t}i,j, dt−1; c) =
max
ct,dt
{u(ct, dt) + βEVt+1(at+1, {Bit+1}i, {Ei}i, {X ij,t+1}i,j, dt−1; c)}
s.t.
at+1 = yt + at · (1 + r)− ct − T (at, wHC,t, wWC,t, dt)
at+1 ≥ 0
Bit+1 = B
i
t · (1 + rB) + τ · wiC,t · diC,t, i ∈ {H,W}
3.1.5 Retirement
At retirement, spouses stop working:
dt = (3, 3) for t > tR
They receive as a lump sum the welfare or minmum pension benefits if they meet
the eligibility criteria, and then withdraw all pension savings and pool them with
their private savings:
atR = atR +B
H
tR
+BWtR + Benefits
There is no uncertainty remaining at this point, and households run down their
total accumulated private and pension savings by optimally saving and consuming
until they die. Letting at denote the total amount of savings at t, pensions included,
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the problem of the retired household becomes:
∀t ∈ {tR, ...tD} Vt(at) = max
at+1
{u(ct, (3, 3)) + β · EVt+1(at+1)}
where ct = at+1 − at · (1 + r)
at ≥ 0
and VtD+1(atD+1) = 0
3.2 Solution Method
The problem of the retired household can be solved analytically. The details are
presented in appendix A. For working periods, the model does not have an analytic
solution. Instead it is numerically solved by backwards recursion.
The details of the solution procedure are the following. At age tR−1, a household
decides on consumption and labor sectors to maximize the weighted sum of current
and future period utilities, denoted by VtR−1(StR−1, {εij,tR−1}), where the state space,
StR−1 , is divided into a deterministic component containing the elements that are not
random at the beginning of period tR− 1, StR−1, and a shock component containing
the vector of random earnings shocks drawn at tR − 1, {εij,tR−1}.
For any given value of the deterministic and shock components of the state space,
optimal consumption is obtained by comparing utility on a grid of possible consump-
tion levels, for each of the nine possible choices of husbands’ and wives’ labor sectors.
The labor decision and associated optimal consumption that maximizes total utility
is chosen for that value of the state space. At any deterministic state point, the
expected value of VtR−1 is obtained by Monte Carlo integration, that is, by taking
draws from the shock vector distribution and averaging to obtain EVtR−1(StR−1) .
This expectation is calculated at a subset of the deterministic state points and the
function is approximated for all other state points by a polynomial regression fol-
lowing an approximation method developed by Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997). I
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denote this function as Emax(tR − 1).
This procedure is repeated at age tR − 2. Using the recursive formulation of the
value function, substituting the Emax(tR − 1) function for the future component,
the optimal decision is computed. Monte Carlo integration over the shock vector at
tR − 2 provides EVtR−2(StR−2) for a given deterministic state point. A polynomial
regression over a subset of the state points again provides an approximation to the
function, denoted by Emax(tR − 2). Repeating the procedure back to the initial
age provides the Emax polynomial approximation at each age. The set of Emax(t)
functions fully describe the solution to the optimization problem.
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Chapter 4
Data and Estimation
4.1 Description of the Dataset and Variables of
Interest
The model is estimated using individual and household earnings, labor sector choice
and asset data from the Encuesta de Proteccion Social longitudinal survey (EPS) to-
gether with the linked administrative records of pension balances and contributions
to retirement accounts, obtained from the Superintendencia de Administradoras de
Fondos de Pension (SAFP) (the Chilean supervising agency for pension fund ad-
ministrators). EPS is a new household survey, conducted in 2002 by the Microdata
Center (Centro de Microdatos) of the Department of Economics of the Universidad
de Chile. It was initially called HLLS and later renamed Encuesta de Proteccion
Social (EPS). The questionnaire was designed specifically to study Chile’s social
protection public programs.1 In 2004 and 2006, two follow-up surveys were admin-
istered. The 2009 follow-up survey was administered in the course of 2009 and was
not exploited in this study.
1Historia Laboral y Seguridad Social
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The 2006 survey contains information on a representative sample of 16443 in-
dividuals of age 15 or older. For the 14337 of them that are affiliated to the AFP
pension system, the administrative records of all the transactions on their pension
accounts are linked to the EPS survey.
The variables used in the estimation are: age, schooling level, schooling level of
the spouse, number of years the respondent worked in the covered sector, number
of years the respondent worked in the uncovered sector, labor sector choice, labor
sector choice of the spouse, annual accepted earnings, individual pension wealth and
private household wealth.
The schooling level variables were constructed as a discrete indicator taking values
4 (individuals with less than 8 years of schooling), 8 (individuals with 8 to 11 years
of schooling), 12 (individuals with 12 to 15 years of schooling), and 16 (individuals
with 16 years of schooling or more). The four categories are labeled No High School,
High School drop-out, High School graduate and College graduate for simplicity
thereafter.
Respondents were asked to report their spells of employment since their first job
or since 1980, whichever happened last. Employment spells in salary jobs with a
contract were coded as covered, while self-employed spells and salary jobs without a
contract were classified as uncovered.2 From employment spells, a monthly indicator
of employment status was constructed. This monthly indicator was aggregated to an
annual indicator in the following way. A respondent with no working months during
the year is Home(d3t = 1). A respondent with a majority of months in covered
jobs is Covered (d2t = 1), and a respondent with a majority of uncovered jobs is
Uncovered (d2t = 1). The annual indicator was then summed from the year in which
the respondent turned 16 to the each year to obtain the number of years in each
labor choice. Regarding the spouse’s labor sector choice, it was constructed in the
2For self-employed workers, contributions to the system are optional rather than mandatory.
About one out of six self-employed worker is actually covered ([1]). This paper assesses the effect
of the constraint imposed by mandatory savings on coverage, so that self-employed workers, who
are not subject to that constraint are classified as uncovered.
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same way for the years the survey was administered (2002-2004-2006). Monthly
labor earnings were reported for each employment spell starting in 2002. They were
summed over each year to obtain annual accepted earning.
Household wealth was reported in the 2004 and 2006 surveys and is composed
of main housing, real estate, cars, savings, equipment, businesses and debts. The
pension wealth of the EPS respondent was obtained from the pension account ad-
ministrative records in the following way. Every time a pension contribution is made
(i.e. every month worked in a covered job), the transaction records the balance on
the account at the time of the contribution. For month in which the respondent
didn’t work in a covered job (i.e. was at home or working in an uncovered job), the
balance is computed using the last available balance, the returns obtained by the cor-
responding pension fund, and the commissions or fees charged by the pension fund
manager. All variables except for pension balances are available for both spouses
in years 2004 and 2006. Pension balances are available for the survey’s interviewee
from 1980 to 2005, but not for his or her spouse. Labor decisions of the survey’s
interviewee are reported from 1980 to 2006 and his or her earnings from 2002 to
2006.
The sample used in the analysis is restricted as follows. First, I keep 8193 mar-
ried and cohabitating couples that have been together at least from 2002 to 2006.
Of those, I exclude 822 who kept their affiliation to the old pension system, which
is not modeled in this paper. Couples formed after the husband turned 25 were also
dropped to avoid having households with significant asset accumulation and work
experience prior to marriage, since initial conditions are kept fixed in the policy
experiments. This leaves 4154 couples. The final sample consists of the 2097 house-
holds that were formed after 1980, and were subject only to the post-1980 privatized
pension system.
The data includes individuals that were born between 1965 and 1981. The older
cohorts are observed from the age of 25 to the age of 51, while the younger cohorts
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are observed only one or two years (see table B.16).
Table B.15 presents summary statistics for the sample. Median private savings
at age 35 in the sample are about 4.8 million pesos, or about 8000 dollars. This cor-
responds roughly to twice the median earnings in the covered sector. In comparison,
median pension savings at the same age are about 2.3 million pesos for males and
0.3 million pesos for females. The relative importance of pension savings increases
over the lifecycle. The fact that the median female pension savings is much lower
and is decreasing with age is due to low female labor force participation, particularly
for older cohorts.
The median male worker earns 2.4 million pesos annually when working in the
covered sector, versus 1.7 million pesos in the uncovered sector. This difference
is in part due to the different levels of schooling in the two sectors. The sample
is divided into 4 schooling levels: less than High School, some High School, High
School graduates and College graduates. Lower schooling levels are over-represented
in the uncovered sector: the fraction of males with no High School education is 24%
among uncovered workers versus 15% in the total sample. Table B.15 also reports
the joint sector choices made by households in the sample: about 37% households
have two working members, 59% have one, and 4% have none. 24% of couples have
two spouses in the same sector: 18% in the covered sector, and 8% in the uncovered
sector. A sizeable fraction of the sample, 13% is comprised of couples that are split
between the two sectors, about 1/3 of all two-income households.
Looking at the fraction of working years spent in the covered sector, it is possible
to distinguish three types of workers. 20% of males and 25% of females work less
than 25% of the time in the covered sector. That is, they almost only work in
uncovered jobs. Similarly, 60% of males and 58% of females work almost exclusively
in covered jobs. Finally, a large fraction of the sample (20% of males and 17% of
females) switches in and out of covered jobs.
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4.2 Estimation of the Model’s Parameters
I estimate the model using a Method of Simulated Moments (MSM).3 I use the
approximated age-dependent value functions, conditional on the state variables, to
simulate moments of the wealth, sector-specific earning and labor choice distribu-
tions. The moments are generated for any given set of parameters by simulating the
behavior of 5 “clones” of the 2, 097 couples in the estimation sample. The estimation
procedure then minimizes the distance between the simulated moments and corre-
sponding data moments. The weights are the inverses of the estimated variances of
the moments.
4.2.1 Data Moments Used in the Estimation
The groups of data moments used for the estimation are listed below with the number
of moments in parentheses:
• Joint Labor Sector Choice:
1. The proportion of households choosing each of the nine joint occupations
by age group (9x6 moments).
2. The proportion of households choosing each of the nine joint occupations
by schooling level of the husband (9x4 moments).
3. The proportion of households choosing each of the nine joint occupations
by schooling level of the wife (9x4 moments).
4. The proportion of two-income households by age group (6 moments).
5. The proportion of two-income households by schooling level of the hus-
band (4 moments).
3This method more easily accommodates missing state variables than does simulated maximum
likelihood, which would require integrating over possible values of missing state variables.
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6. The proportion of two-income households by schooling level of the wife
(4 moments).
7. The proportion of one-income households by age group (6 moments).
8. The proportion of one-income households by schooling level of the hus-
band (4 moments).
9. The proportion of one-income households by schooling level of the wife (4
moments).
10. The proportion of husbands choosing each of the three alternatives by
schooling level(3x4 moments).
11. The proportion of husbands choosing each of the three alternatives by age
group (3x6 moments).
12. The proportion of wives choosing each of the three alternatives by school-
ing level(3x4 moments).
13. The proportion of wives choosing each of the three alternatives by age
group (3x6 moments).
14. The proportion of husbands choosing each of the three alternatives by
5-year tranches of covered experience (3x6 moments).
15. The proportion of husbands choosing each of the three alternatives by
5-year tranches of uncovered experience (3x6 moments).
16. The proportion of wives choosing each of the three alternatives by 5-year
tranches of covered experience (3x6 moments).
17. The proportion of wives choosing each of the three alternatives by 5-year
tranches uncovered experience (3x6 moments).
18. The proportion of husbands choosing each of the three alternatives by
agegroup and birth cohort ((6+6+5+4+3)x3 moments).4
4Cohorts 1 and 2 are observed over 6 age groups, cohort 3 over 5 age groups etc.
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19. The proportion of wives choosing each of the three alternatives by age-
group and birth cohort ((6+6+5+4+3)x3 moments).5
• Wealth:
1. The mean private savings level by age and schooling level of the husband
(4x6 moments).
2. The mean private savings level by age and schooling level of the wife (4x6
moments).
3. The variance of private savings by age (6 moments).
4. The variance of private savings by schooling level of the husband (4 mo-
ments).
5. The variance of private savings by schooling level of the wife (4 moments).
6. The mean pension savings level by sex, age and schooling level (2x4x6
moments).
7. The variance of pension savings by sex and age (2x6 moments).
8. The variance of pension savings by sex and schooling level (2x4 moments).
9. Fraction with no private savings by age group (5 moments).
10. Fraction with private savings between 0 and 6 million pesos by age group
(5 moments).
11. Fraction with private savings over 6 million pesos by age group (5 mo-
ments).
12. The mean private savings level by age and current sector of the husband
(2x6 moments).
13. The mean private savings level by age and current sector of the wife (2x6
moments).
5The labor force participation decisions of cohorts 1 and 2 are observed over 6 age groups, cohort
3 over 5 age groups etc.
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14. The mean pension savings level by agegroup and birth cohort (6+5+4+3+2
moments).
• Earnings:
1. The mean annual log-earnings by sex, age and sector (2x6x2 moments).
2. The variance of the annual log-earnings by sex, age and sector (2x6x2
moments).
3. The mean annual log-earnings by sex, age and schooling level (2x4x2
moments).
4. The variance of the annual log-earnings by sex, age and schooling level
(2x4x2 moments).
5. The mean annual log-earnings by sex, sector and experience (2x2x6 mo-
ments).
6. The mean first-difference in annual log-earnings by current and 1-year
lagged sector and by sex(2x2x2 moments).
7. The mean first difference in annual log-earnings by age, current sector
and by sex (6x2x2 moments).
• Career Transitions:
1. 2-period joint transitions of number of working spouses in the household
(9 moments).
2. 1-period transitions between the three employment status by age group
and sex (3x3x6x2 moments).
3. mean years in each sector by age group and sex (3x6x2 moments).
4. Fraction of years in covered sector under age 35 by sex (5x2 moments).
5. Fraction of years in covered sector over age 35 by sex (5x2 moments).
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6. Fraction of years at home under age 35 by sex (5x2 moments).
7. Fraction of years at home over age 35 by sex (5x2 moments).
The total number of moments is M = 953, the number of parameter to be
estimated is K = 59.
4.2.2 Standard Errors
Let’s denote xmi the contribution of observation i to moment m, i ∈ 1..N,m ∈ 1...M .
Denote Sm the set, and Nm the number, of observations that contribute to moment
m. Finally, the theoretical model predicts a value for each moment, denoted µm(θ),
where θ = [θ1, ... θK ] is the vector of estimated parameters.
The Method of Simulated Moments estimator is defined as:
θ̂N = arg max
θ∈Θ
[
1
Nm
∑
i∈Sm
(xmi − µm(θ))
]′
m=1...M
W−1
[
1
Nm
∑
i∈Sm
(xmi − µm(θ))
]
m=1...M
.
The inverse of the weighting matrix W is an M by M diagonal matrix with the
mth diagonal elements equal to the sample variance of xmi .
Given the moments chosen above, not all observations contribute to all moments.
In order to derive the asymptotic properties of the estimator it is convenient to note
that:
θ̂N =
arg max
θ∈Θ
[
1
N
∑
i∈S
(xmi − µm(θ)) ·Dmi ·
1
Nm
]′
W−1
[
1
N
∑
i∈S
(xmi − µm(θ)) ·Dmi ·
1
Nm
]
where Dmi is a dummy that is equal to one if observation i contributes to moment
m, and S is the union of all Sms.
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Taking first order conditions with respect to θ yields:
[
1
N
δµm
δθ
|θ̂N
]′
W−1
[
1
N
∑
i∈S
(xmi − µm(θ)) ·Dmi ·
1
Nm
]
= 0 (4.1)
A Taylor expansion of µm around the true parameter vector θ0 yields:
µm(θ̂N) = µ
m(θ0) +
δµm
δθ
|θ∗ · (θ̂N − θ0) (4.2)
for some θ∗ between θ̂N and θ0. Combining (4.1) and (4.2), we obtain after rear-
ranging:
√
N(θ̂N − θ0) =[[
δµm
δθ
|θ̂N
]′
W−1
[
δµm
δθ
|θ̂∗
]]−1 [
δµm
δθ
|θ̂N
]′
W−1
[
1√
N
∑
i∈S
(xmi − µm(θ0)) ·Dmi ·
N
Nm
]
.
A central limit theorem can be applied after redefining
x̃mi ≡ xmi ·Dmi ·
(
N
Nm
)
and
µ̃mi (θ0) ≡ µmi (θ0) ·Dmi ·
(
N
Nm
)
.
The estimator’s asymptotic variance-covariance matrix is given by:
Asy.V ar(θ̂N) =
(
D′0W
−1D0
)−1
D′0W
−1W−10 W
−1D0
(
D′0W
−1D0
)−1′
,
where D0 = E
[
δµm
δθ
|θ0
]
, W0 = E
(
[x̃mi − µ̃mi (θ0)]
′ [x̃mj − µ̃mj (θ0)]).
In computing the standard errors, D0 is approximated by the numerical deriva-
tives of the model’s moments at the estimated vector of parameters, W0 is approxi-
mated by the sample variance-covariance of
[
x̃mj − µ̃mj (θ0)
]
, and the standard errors
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are corrected for the variance resulting from replacing the true model-implied mo-
ments by simulated moments. The standard errors are reported below the parameter
estimates in tables B.1, B.2, B.3 and B.4.
4.3 Estimation Results
4.3.1 Parameter Estimates
Tables B.1, B.2, B.3 and B.4 report parameter estimates with the standard errors
in parentheses. The discount rate is estimated at 0.067 (for a discount factor of
0.937). This is slightly higher than what is usually found in models estimated or
calibrated on American data (usually under 0.05). However, this is to be compared
to the higher interest rates experienced by Chile over the estimation period. In fact,
the ratio 1+r
1+ρ
, which drives asset accumulation, is close to what is found elsewhere in
the literature at 1.0127 (compared to 1.0106 in [12], for example). The elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is estimated at 1.559, which is within the (wide) range of
estimates found in the literature. For example [26] find estimates of 1.59 and 1.68,
and [12] obtain 1.397.
Some parameters from the earnings offer function are worth highlighting. First,
experience transferability is estimated to be high, at 0.97. This would imply that
sector-specific human capital accumulation is not an important factor in keeping
workers away from the covered sector. It must be noted that the standard errors on
this parameter are relatively high at 0.111. On the other hand, the probability of
receiving a covered offer is significantly below one, but only for the lowest schooling
level. Male workers with no High School and one year of experience in the covered
sector have almost 5% of chances of not receiving a covered offer every period (see
figure C.2). The importance of this is magnified by the fact that workers antici-
pate that if they accept a covered offer they might have to switch sectors and pay
the corresponding non-pecuniary costs sometime in the future. This probability is
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lower as covered experience is accumulated, but only to an extent. No High School
male workers with 15 years of covered experience still face about 3% chances of not
receiving a covered offer (see figure C.3). The probability of receiving a covered
offer increases with the schooling level, and is, for example, 0.99 for High School
dropouts with 15 years of experience. In other words, only low schooling workers
find themselves sometimes exogenously excluded from the covered sector. Also, the
returns to education are estimated to be higher in the uncovered sector than in the
covered sector (3.4% higher for men and 1.8% higher for women). This implies that
the earnings gap between sectors is higher for low schooling levels. Overall, these
estimates suggest that the segmented or residual model of the uncovered sector is
relevant for workers with low levels of schooling, possibly because minimum wage
regulations induce an excess supply of labor in the covered sector. For workers with
some schooling, however, even High School dropouts, the estimates are consistent
with an uncovered sector that offers real “career” opportunities, with human capital
accumulation that is portable to jobs in the covered sector.
4.3.2 Model Fit
We next examine evidence on how the model fits the data within sample. Tables
B.5 and B.6 provide evidence on the within-sample fit of the model in the savings
accumulation dimension. Tables B.7, B.8, B.9, B.10, B.11 and B.12 show aspects of
the labor sector choices. Tables B.13 and B.14 summarize earnings.
First, the model is able to generate the overall dispersion of the private savings,
pension savings and earnings in the sample, as seen in tables B.5 and B.6. In
addition, the education and age patterns of mean savings and earnings are well
captured overall. Two aspects of the fit could be improved. First, the model tends
to underpredict pension savings accumulation at older ages for college graduates.
Looking at earnings, the mean for that schooling level are also lower in the model
simulations than in the data. In fact, college graduate earnings exhibits a fat right
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tail of high earners that the model is not well equipped to capture. The fact that these
high earnings are persistent over time explains that this right tail in the earnings
distribution also translates into a fat right tail in the pension savings distribution,
which is responsible for the underestimation of college graduate pension savings.
The pension savings accumulated by these high earning individuals will tend to pull
the mean up at older ages.6 The second aspect is the low mean earnings of younger
males and of females in the uncovered sector. This comes from workers who are only
partially employed during the year, a situation that is common in the informal sector
at younger ages. Since I make the simplifying assumption not to model the intensive
margin of the labor supply decision, the model is not well equipped to capture that
fact.
Second, the joint labor force participation of couples in the nine possible pairs of
employment choices (table B.7) is also well captured. So are the individual choices
of husbands and wives, summarized by age (table B.8) and schooling level (table
B.9). For example, the model reproduces the high percentage of women with no
High School education who stay home (14.8% versus 13.4% in the data) and the
much lower percentage for college graduates (27.4% versus 25.0% in the data).
Third, it is important that the model captures how workers switch or stay in
the same sector over their careers as seen in table B.10. The model reproduces
the bimodal distribution of time spent in the covered sector at different ages and
for the two genders. For example, 18.8% of men under 35 have worked than 25%
of the time in covered jobs (18.8% in the data), while 58.7% have worked more
than 75% of the time in covered jobs (58.5% in the data). Tables B.11 and B.12
show the individual transition matrices for 45-50 year-old men and women and for
their younger counterparts (25-30). In particular, the persistence in sector choices is
adequately captured for both genders and age groups.
6A possible remedy would be to introduce unobserved heterogeneity in the earnings offer, effec-
tively allowing for persistently high earnings and pension savings accumulation for a fraction of the
sample.
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Chapter 5
Policy Experiments
Having estimated the structural parameters governing preferences, earnings offers
and labor market segmentation, I use the model to perform policy experiments that
assess the effect of the rules of the pension system on asset accumulation, pension
system coverage, labor force participation, and the fiscal cost of the pension system’s
safety net. In particular, I solve the model under the alternative rules, and simu-
late the decisions of the sampled households from the first decision period (start of
marriage/cohabitation) rather than imposing the new rules form a given year on, in
order to evaluate the long-term effects of the alternative rules.1
Given that they are primitives of the model, the estimated preference parame-
ters can be taken as invariant to policy changes. The prices in the labor and capital
markets, however, might be subject to equilibrium adjustments when pension rules
are changed. Equilibrium effects could operate through three channels. First, asset
returns might adjust to an increase or a reduction in household savings, thus atten-
uating the behavioral response to the policy change. It seems reasonable to assume,
however, that Chile is a small open economy and that asset returns are invariant to
the policy experiment. Second, the adjustment in the relative wages of the covered
1Note that the experiments are not tax-neutral: the additional cost to the government are not
translated into higher taxes. Results for same policy changes modeled as an unanticipated and
tax-neutral event will be the object of future work.
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and uncovered sector can be expected to reduce the extent to which workers switch
sectors in response to changes in the rules of the system. Similarly, if new rules cause
workers to reduce their labor force participation, wages might go up in equilibrium
and limit the magnitude of the response. The wage equilibrium effects are outside
the scope of my paper, so the estimates of the employment responses to the policy
experiments presented here should be taken as upper bounds on the equilibrium
response.
In reporting the effects of the policy experiment, I use 2004 as the baseline year
since the EPS sample was chosen to be representative of the Chilean population in
that year. As previously noted, there are several sample selection criteria and the
results here apply only to the sample analyzed.
5.1 Alternative Contribution Rules
I first study changes in the mandatory pension contribution rate, which is currently
set at 10%. The goal of the experiment is to understand the strength of the incen-
tives for workers to switch to the uncovered sector in order to avoid paying pension
contributions. In other words, the idea is to determine to what extent low pension
coverage might be related to the level of illiquid pension contribution. In addition,
from a public finance point of view, it is interesting to see whether higher pension
contributions result in higher total savings and how the cost of the pension system
is affected.
5.1.1 Findings
Table B.17 summarizes the outcomes of interest under counterfactual contribution
rates ranging from 5% to 20%. Realized pension returns after 2009 are assumed
to be 5.98%, which corresponds to the weighted average return on Chile’s pension
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funds from 2002 to 20092. Statistics like mean savings and the fraction of husbands
and wives in each occupation are reported for the year 2004. I also project the
decisions of the households in the sample until retirement to obtain age profiles of
mean private and pension savings (pooling together all birth cohorts in the sample),
eligibility for minimum pension benefits and government liabilities.
The exercise essentially measures the elasticity of pension coverage to the level of
pension contributions implied by the model. Changes in the mandatory contribution
rate can affect pension coverage and labor force participation by reducing the value
of covered earnings offers. The predicted coverage rate in 2004 shows that households
significantly adjust their labor force participation in response to a change in manda-
tory savings. Increasing the contribution rate from 10 to 15 percent decreases the
coverage rate by 1.1 percentage points or 5.9% for husbands and 16.5% for wives. In
addition, female labor force participation decreases by 3.2%. However, the coverage
rate by itself provides an incomplete picture of participation in the pension system.
It does not capture whether the same workers participate continuously over their
lifetime while others never do or whether most workers switch in and out of covered
jobs to some extent. To see this, I consider the density of contributions, which is the
number of years in which contributions where made over the number of working-age
years.3 Table B.18 shows the distribution of contribution densities at age 64 under
a contribution rate of 10% and 15%. As expected, contribution densities are lower
when the contribution rate is higher. However, different parts of the distribution are
affected by changes in the contribution rate for men and women. Women who reduce
their participation in the covered sector are those with otherwise low contribution
densities. The fraction of women with more than 75% of contributions remains vir-
tually unchanged. In other words, a higher contribution rate discourages sporadic
participation in the covered sector. In contrast, the whole contribution density dis-
tribution for male shifts to the left, exhibiting more workers with only uncovered
2The effect of different returns assumptions are explored in the second policy experiment.
3I define working ages as ranging between 16 and 64.
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experience and fewer with only covered experience.
In addition to impacting coverage, the contribution rate could be a tool to increase
aggregate savings by effectively imposing a lower bound on a household’s overall
saving rate. However, the magnitude of that effect depends on the extent to which
households can make countervailing adjustments to their private savings. The effect
of the contribution rate on asset accumulation is captured by several statistics. First,
I report the average private, pension and total savings for the sample in 2004 in
the different scenarios. The results show that total savings respond strongly to an
increase in the contribution rate: increasing the contribution rate from 10 to 15
percent increases average total savings by 13.4%, from 10.8 to 12.2 million pesos.
This effect can be decomposed into an increase in pension savings (+1.7 million pesos
for males and +0.3 million pesos for females) partially offset by a decrease in private
savings (-0.6 million pesos).
The contribution rate also affects the cost of the state-provided safety net. First,
if high contributions reduce participation in the covered sector, fewer workers will
reach the number of years of contributions requirement to obtain the minimum pen-
sion. Second, conditional on being eligible, workers subject to a higher contribution
rate requirement are less likely to have a pension below the guaranteed minimum. To
assess the impact of the contribution rate on government liabilities, I determine for
each individual in the sample whether they qualify for either the minimum pension
or the welfare pension and compute the present value of predicted benefits payments.
I discount the payments by the risk free rate and average over the total number of
individuals in the sample. I project that less than 2% of males and 5% of females
will qualify for the minimum pension. This results from the level of the minimum
pension level (about 3/4 of the minimum wage), the number of years of contributions
required to qualify and the returns achieved by the system. Conditional on reaching
the 20 years of contribution, few workers will accumulate less than the minimum
pension level. As a consequence, the projected liability of workers in the sample
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remains limited at 655000 pesos per capita. That is, if the government wanted to
pay off in 2004 all future benefits to workers in the sample, it would have to pay the
equivalent of 6 months worth of the minimum wage to each of them. Multiplied by
the total Chilean population this sum would represent 11% of GDP.4
5.2 Ex-ante Evaluation of the 2008 Reform of the
Safety Net
The second policy experiment studies the effect of the 2008 reform of the safety net
that was described in the introduction. The objectives of the reform were to protect
workers with few pension contributions against old age poverty while increasing cov-
erage by improving incentives to participate in the system. The model considers two
channels by which retirement transfers can affect pension coverage. First, benefits
can reduce labor force participation through an income effect. Second, the safety
net might create a implicit marginal tax rate on additional pension contributions if
they render the worker ineligible or reduce his claims to benefits.
I consider the question of whether the new system will improve or reduce pension
coverage, and compare the predicted liabilities it will generate with that generated
by the pre-2008 system’s. My approach simulates the sample’s lifetime decisions
under the two pension system designs and compare outcomes. This exercise requires
making an assumption on the realized rate of return achieved by pension funds. In
the simulations, I use the historical realized rate of return from 1981 to 2009, and also
consider three alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, post-2009 returns are fixed
at 9.94%, which is the mean return on the years spanned by my data (1981-2006).
In the second scenario I use the mean return from 2002 to 2009, which includes large
negative returns corresponding to the 2008 financial crisis (The Chilean pension
4See [16] for a discussion of implicit pension debt calculations
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funds lost about 20% of their value in 2008), for an average of 5.98%.5 Finally I
consider a low return scenario, in which pension accounts accrue 2.99%, or half the
returns in the second scenario.
5.2.1 Findings
The results of the simulations are presented in table B.19. I list the same outcomes
as in the alternative contribution rate policy experiment, namely the fraction of
husbands and wives in each sector in 2004, the fraction with contribution densities
below 75% at retirement, mean private and pension savings in 2004 and by age until
retirement, the fraction of the sample that is eligible for retirement transfers and the
present value of those transfers, per capita, in 2004.
If we look at the coverage rates in the sample in 2004, the reform has almost
no effect on males and a small negative effect on females (-1.9%). However, the
sample only contains the relatively young cohorts that started working under the
new system, after 1980. As a result, the 2004 coverage rate does not capture the
effects of the reform at older ages. In tables B.20 and B.21, I reproduce the projected
sector choices by age groups. Although decisions at younger ages remain largely
unaffected, the reform has a significant effect as retirement nears. For example the
fraction of 60-64 year-old males who work in the covered sector decreases by 4.8%
while females show a similar effect that starts earlier in the lifecycle and increases
progressively with age.
The effect on uncovered sector participation differs in sign for males and females.
Under the reformed system, females are less likely to work in either sector, which is
consistent with an income effect on the demand for the home sector. However, males
increase their participation in the uncovered sector as a result of the reform, which
5Before 2000, each pension fund managed a unique portfolio. I use the average of all the funds’
returns weighted by their value at the end of each year. In 2000 and 2002, pension funds were
required to managed additional portfolios with different risk-return profiles. By default most ac-
counts were attributed to the medium risk portfolio or “fondo C”, whose returns I use in calculating
returns post 2000.
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cannot be explained by an income effect. A closer look at the change in marginal tax
rates provides a explanation. Although workers who would have qualified for either
the welfare or the minimum pension in the old system see their implicit marginal
tax rate decrease, and their incentives to work in covered jobs increase, the reverse
is true of workers who become eligible under the 2008 reform. Those would see
their marginal tax rate increase instead of decrease. Table B.19 shows that the
fraction eligible for any kind of retirement income transfer increases by 16.6 and
13.7 percentage points for husbands and wives respectively under the reform. This
implies that the fraction of workers for whom the marginal tax rate increased is
higher than that of workers for whom it decreased, which explains the shift towards
the uncovered sector.
The expansion of the number of beneficiaries also implies an increase in the fiscal
cost of the safety net. Table B.19 reports predicted eligibility and fiscal liabilities for
the old welfare pension, the old guaranteed minimum pension and the new welfare
pension. Under the baseline scenario, with returns on pension accounts of 5.98%, the
present value of liabilities in the old system is estimated at 655, 300 pesos per capita,
versus 4, 311, 260 for the new system, which is 6.5 times higher. Multiplied by the
Chilean population, these numbers correspond to 10.8% and 71.7% of the country’s
GDP in 2004. This large difference is due to the fact that only 1.5% of husbands
and 4.4% of wives would have qualified for the guaranteed minimum pension, and
another 3.6% of households would have received the lower welfare pension, according
the model’s projections. By contrast, 21.7% of households are projected to receive
benefits under the old system, and benefits will be on average higher than in the old
system.
Predictions under alternative levels of realized returns show that the cost of the
old safety net is very sensitive to pension returns and increases substantially when
pension returns are low. Assuming returns of 2.99%, the percent eligible for the
old minimum pension goes up to 10.8% for males and 7.4%, and the cost of the old
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safety net is multiplied by 2.5, at 1, 611, 320 pesos per capita (eq. to 26.6% of GDP).
In comparison, the fiscal cost of the new system is also sensitive to returns, but the
cost only increases by 50%.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The existence of a large uncovered labor market, in which it is difficult to mandate
participation to pension schemes, poses formidable challenges for designing pension
systems in developing countries. In many of them, the fraction of workers who
contribute to the existing pension scheme is low. In this context, choosing how much
workers should contribute could affect participation, pension savings accumulation
and ultimately the cost for the State to provide a safety-net in the form of retirement
income subsidies. Conversely, generous eligibility requirements and benefits for such
a safety-net could also crowd-out individual pension and private savings, further
increasing the fiscal cost of the system. This study explores these mechanisms by
specifying and estimating a dynamic model of employment and savings decisions for
a sample of Chilean couples under a privatized pension system. The model explicitly
incorporates the main features of the pioneering Chilean pension system and allows
households to adjust to pension regulation through a private saving decision and by
varying the labor force participation decision of each spouse. In addition, the model
accounts for the existence of a large uncovered labor market, in which household
members can work without being subject to pension contributions.
In particular, this study attempts to determine to what extent pension rules
themselves can be held responsible for the problem of low participation to the pension
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system. Specifically, are workers avoiding pension contributions? Do social pensions
crowd-out contributions? Or are workers being rationed out of covered jobs due to
labor market segmentation? In addition, it tries to assess what the effects of actual
or potential policies that aim to increase income in retirement will be. This include
increasing the contribution rate, and expand social pensions in the way Chile did it
in 2008.
I find that Chilean data used in estimation are broadly consistent with a com-
petitive, as opposed to a segmented, uncovered labor market sector. Labor market
segmentation accounts for 13% of uncovered work overall (up to 22% for workers
with no High School education).
I also predict that participation in jobs covered by the pension system are sensitive
to the rules of the pension system. A higher contribution rate reduces participation
in jobs that are covered by the pension system at a rate of 1 percentage point
of coverage per additional percentage point of contribution. Private and pension
savings are found to be only partial substitutes. Higher contributions would be
partially offset by a reduction in private savings: the decrease in private savings
equals roughly 25% of the increase pension savings. This implies that increasing
contributions from 10% to 15% would increase total savings by 14%.
The model is used to ex-ante evaluate the 2008 expansion of Chile’s safety net. I
find that the reform operates a large redistribution towards workers with low pension
saving accumulation and will result in a large increase in fiscal liabilities linked to
welfare pensions (about 6 times the cost of the previous safety net). In addition,
reduced labor force participation at older ages should be expected (husbands -5%,
wives -23%) despite a design that tries encourage participation.
Future research would be needed to externally validate the model using the next,
post-reform round of the survey. In addition, it would be interesting to conduct
revenue-neutral policy experiments, that take into account the impact of the income
tax increases required to finance the new safety net. The effects of a number of
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other possible policies could be investigated: alternative taper rates, matching of
contributions by the State, and age-dependent contribution rates.
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Appendix A
Solution of the retired household’s
problem
The solution of the problem is derived from the period budget constraints, the ter-
minal condition atD+1 = 0 and the set of Euler Equations:
∀t ∈ {tR, ...tD − 1} u′(ct) = β · (1 + r) · u′(ct+1)
Given the CRRA preferences, the Euler equations become:
∀t ∈ {tR, ...tD − 1} ct+1 = β · (1 + r)
1
σ · ct
Let us iterate this relationship to obtain consumption at each period ct as a function
of consumption at retirement ctR :
∀t ∈ {tR, ...tD − 1} ct = ctR · (β(1 + r))
t−tR
σ
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A vertical summation of the period budget constraints, premultiplied by ( 1
1+r
)t−tR ,
yields:
atR =
tD∑
t=tR
(
1
1 + r
)t−tRct
The solution is characterized by consumption at each period as a function of assets
at retirement:
ctR = atR ·
1∑tD
t=tR
( pt
ptR
· (β(1 + r)1−σ)t−tR) 1σ
∀t ∈ {tR, ...tD − 1} ct = ctR · (β(1 + r))
t−tR
σ
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Appendix B
Tables
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Table B.1: Parameter Estimates: Preferences
Name Symbol Value
Discount factor ρ 0.067
(0.00155)
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution σ 1.559
(0.03661)
Value of leisure (Female - type 1) δW 0.085
(0.00329)
Value of leisure (Female - type 2) δW 0.044
(0.00219)
Value of leisure (Female - type 3) δW 0.180
(0.01715)
Value of leisure (Male - type 1) δH 0.095
(0.00657)
Value of leisure (Male - type 2) δH 0.009
(0.00219)
Value of leisure (Male - type 3) δH 0.008
(0.01890)
Cost of switching sectors (Male) φHs 0.074
(0.00438)
Cost of switching sectors (Female) φWs 0.262
(0.01694)
Cost of returning to work (Male) φHa 0.258
(0.02044)
Cost of returning to work (Female) φWa 0.724
(0.05000)
Standard Deviation of Leisure shocks (Male) σHP 0.001
(0.00007)
Standard Deviation of Leisure shocks (Female) σWP 0.001
(0.00006)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table B.2: Parameter Estimates: Earnings Offers
Name Symbol Male Female
Covered sector constant αiC -0.565 -1.364
(0.02500) (0.02592)
Uncovered sector constant αiU -1.060 -1.789
(0.01180) (0.01373)
Cohort effect θc 0.050* 0.050*
(0.00490) (0.00490)
Returns to education (Covered sector) θiE,C 0.085 0.067
(0.00910) (0.01522)
Returns to education (Uncovered sector) θiE,U 0.119 0.085
(0.00890) (0.01411)
Returns to covered experience θiX,C 0.020 0.045
(0.00098) (0.00190)
Returns to uncovered experience θiX,U 0.023 0.039
(0.00110) (0.00190)
Experience-schooling interaction θiX,E 0.003 0.005
(0.00030) (0.00035)
Experience-schooling interaction (College graduates) θiX,E 0.018 0.005
(0.00110) (0.00094)
Experience transferability τ jXP 0.971* 0.971*
(0.11114) (0.11114)
Sd of shocks to earnings offers (Covered) σiC 0.219 0.208
(0.01296) (0.03129)
Sd of shocks to earning offers (Uncovered) σiU 0.265 0.134
(0.02324) (0.02221)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Cohort effects and experience transferability were constrained to be equal across
gender and sectors to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated.
Table B.3: Parameter Estimates: Probability of Receiving a Covered Offer
Name Symbol Male Female
Constant γi 1.999 2.167
(0.33419) (0.54840)
Schooling level γiE 0.999 0.881
(0.17035) (0.25461)
Covered Job at t-1 γiCov 0.098 0.995
(0.0457) (0.41108)
Covered experience γiXP 0.029 0.072
(0.00876) (0.02756)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table B.4: Parameter Estimates: Types Logit Parameters
Name Symbol Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Constant λ(ψ) -1.310* 1.899 0.019
(0.20512) (0.06689)
Schooling level (Husband) λHE (ψ) 0.701* -0.207 -1.203
(0.06608) (0.38683)
Schooling level (Wife) λWE (ψ) 0.001* -0.339 -1.201
(0.07867) (0.28379)
Cohort λCE(ψ) 0.002* -0.298 1.042
(0.05728) (0.10012)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Since the type probabilities must sum to one, the coefficients of only two out of
three Types can be identified so Type 1’s coefficients were held fixed through estimation.
Table B.5: Model Fit: Private Savings
Data Model
mean 6.46 7.35
sd 8.41 7.80
p10 -.06 .09
p50 4.12 5.45
p90 16.25 16.54
By Age
20 3.64 4.03
25 4.03 5.80
30 5.46 6.94
35 6.80 7.80
40 8.09 8.39
45 9.47 8.22
By Education of the Husband
No HS 4.75 4.98
HS dropout 5.51 6.75
HS grad 7.04 7.84
College grad 11.86 11.81
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Table B.6: Model Fit: Pension savings
Husband Wife
Data Model Data Model
mean 1.21 1.22 .29 .28
sd 2.22 1.72 .90 .87
p10 0 0 0 0
p50 .39 .58 0 0
p90 3.20 3.35 0.75 0.78
By Age
20 .18 .29 .07 .10
25 .61 .70 .17 .19
30 1.50 1.58 .34 .35
35 2.91 2.73 .64 .57
40 4.91 3.80 1.15 .85
By Education of the Husband
No HS .50 .57 .07 .23
HS dropout .91 1.03 .16 .26
HS grad 1.59 1.48 .42 .32
College grad 2.75 2.29 .56 .38
Table B.7: Model Fit: Household Labor Force Participation
Data Model
Husband’s/Wife’s sector
Covered/Covered 18.0% 20.0%
Covered/Uncovered 7.5% 8.6%
Covered/Home 40.2% 41.7%
Uncovered/Covered 6.3% 8.6%
Uncovered/Uncovered 4.9% 3.6%
Uncovered/Home 16.7% 14.5%
Home/Covered 1.4% 2.0%
Home/Uncovered 0.9% 0.3%
Home/Home 4.1% 0.5%
49
Table B.8: Model fit: Labor sector choice by age
Husbands Wives
Data Model Data Model
Covered Sector
20 66.0% 63.9% 30.8% 23.9%
25 71.8% 69.0% 28.5% 27.6%
30 68.3% 70.2% 26.1% 27.0%
35 65.1% 69.5% 25.4% 24.8%
40 60.7% 69.7% 24.4% 23.9%
45 61.4% 67.8% 20.5% 22.7%
Uncovered Sector
20 26.2% 31.4% 10.4% 8.7%
25 25.2% 28.0% 9.9% 10.4%
30 28.4% 26.2% 11.2% 12.4%
35 30.7% 27.2% 15.0% 13.3%
40 33.8% 26.4% 18.0% 10.1%
45 31.5% 27.1% 19.9% 10.6%
Home
20 7.8% 4.7% 58.8% 67.3%
25 3.1% 3.0% 61.6% 62.1%
30 3.3% 3.6% 62.8% 60.6%
35 4.3% 3.3% 59.6% 61.9%
40 5.5% 3.9% 57.6% 66.1%
45 7.1% 5.2% 59.6% 66.7%
50
Table B.9: Model fit: Labor sector choice by schooling level
Husbands Wives
Data Model Data Model
Covered Sector
No H.S. 51.4% 63.7% 13.4% 14.8%
H.S. dropout 63.4% 66.8% 19.3% 18.5%
H.S. grad 75.2% 71.2% 34.3% 31.6%
Col. Grad 77.6% 76.4% 61.5% 64.9%
Uncovered Sector
No H.S. 42.0% 27.6% 10.7% 8.5%
H.S. dropout 32.8% 29.5% 14.4% 11.3%
H.S. grad 21.0% 26.8% 11.7% 12.3%
Col. Grad 14.8% 23.1% 13.5% 7.8%
Home
No H.S. 6.6% 8.7% 75.9% 76.7%
H.S. dropout 3.8% 3.7% 66.3% 70.2%
H.S. grad 3.8% 2.0% 54.0% 56.1%
Col. Grad 7.6% 0.5% 25.0% 27.4%
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Table B.10: Model fit: Distribution of years worked in covered jobs/total years
worked
Data Model
Husbands under age 35
0-25% 18.8% 18.8%
25-50% 8.1% 6.2%
50-75% 14.3% 16.6%
75-99% 23.0% 29.7%
100% 35.7% 28.8%
Husbands over age 35
0-25% 12.7% 15.9%
25-50% 7.3% 6.8%
50-75% 13.4% 15.4%
75-99% 17.5% 20.9%
100% 49.1% 41.0%
Wives under age 35
0-25% 24.1% 32.1%
25-50% 8.8% 7.9%
50-75% 9.2% 12.8%
75-99% 10.1% 10.5%
100% 47.8% 36.7%
Wives over age 35
0-25% 15.2% 22.5%
25-50% 6.8% 5.4%
50-75% 10.9% 8.6%
75-99% 11.0% 8.0%
100% 56.1% 55.5%
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Table B.11: Model fit: Transitions between labor sector choices (age 45-50)
Husbands Wives
Data Model Data Model
From Covered... ... to Covered 93.5% 94.2% 83.7% 90.8%
...to Uncovered 5.4% 4.9% 9.3% 0.8%
...to Inactive 1.1% 0.9% 7.0% 8.5%
From Inactive... ... to Covered 27.3% 18.2% 3.9% 0.8%
...to Uncovered 13.6% 16.7% 8.7% 3.2%
...to Inactive 59.1% 65.2% 87.4% 95.9%
From Uncovered... ...to Covered 12.9% 11.5% 5.6% 2.2%
...to Uncovered 83.0% 81.7% 78.7% 78.8%
...to Inactive 4.1% 6.8% 15.7% 19.0%
Table B.12: Model fit: Transitions between labor sector choices (age 25-30)
Husbands Wives
Data Model Data Model
From Covered... ...to Covered 95.5% 91.5% 84.2% 94.5%
...to Uncovered 3.7% 7.4% 2.5% 0.7%
...to Inactive 0.8% 1.1% 13.3% 4.8%
From Inactive... ...to Covered 31.5% 31.8% 4.2% 3.2%
...to Uncovered 6.6% 23.1% 2.4% 3.7%
...to Inactive 61.9% 45.0% 93.4% 93.1%
From Uncovered... ...to Covered 9.6% 21.2% 5.6% 3.0%
...to Uncovered 89.8% 76.4% 79.2% 78.9%
...to Inactive 0.5% 2.4% 15.2% 18.1%
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Table B.13: Model Fit: Earnings (Husbands)
Covered Sector Uncovered Sector
Data Model Data Model
Distribution
mean 2.92 2.97 2.41 2.63
sd 2.13 1.99 2.13 2.00
p10 1.38 1.20 0.72 0.81
p50 2.4 2.50 1.80 2.14
p90 5.35 5.26 4.71 5.04
By Age
20 2.08 2.41 1.57 2.44
25 2.59 2.65 1.91 2.57
30 2.96 2.82 2.54 2.59
35 2.91 3.05 2.54 2.66
40 3.21 3.31 2.39 2.67
45 3.64 3.49 3.18 2.82
By Schooling level
No HS 1.77 1.57 1.42 1.11
HS dropout 2.18 2.32 2.13 2.00
HS grad 3.29 3.35 3.09 3.34
College grad 6.44 5.96 5.50 5.35
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Table B.14: Model Fit: Earnings (Wives)
Covered Sector Uncovered Sector
Data Model Data Model
Distribution
mean 1.78 1.68 1.13 0.86
sd 1.21 1.35 1.03 0.62
p10 0.41 0.54 0.15 0.31
p50 1.56 1.33 0.84 0.70
p90 3.60 3.23 2.40 1.58
By Age
20 1.40 1.06 0.77 0.72
25 1.94 1.30 1.14 0.77
30 2.01 1.57 0.96 0.80
35 1.66 1.77 1.07 0.84
40 1.62 2.09 1.21 0.98
45 1.97 2.4 1.66 1.01
By Schooling level
No HS 0.93 0.87 0.72 0.44
HS dropout 1.23 1.18 0.96 0.73
HS grad 1.92 1.77 1.32 0.95
College grad 2.89 2.82 2.31 1.77
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Table B.15: Summary statistics
Husband Wife Household
Private assets (million pesos)
median at 25 - - 1.5
median at 35 - - 4.8
median at 45 - - 8
Pension savings (million pesos)
median at 25 0.3 0.1 -
median at 35 2.3 0.3 -
median at 45 4.5 0.0 -
Median annual earnings (thousand pesos)
Covered sector jobs 2409 1547 -
Uncovered sector jobs 1680 720 -
Schooling level (sample)
No High school 15% 15% -
High school dropouts 36% 36% -
High school graduates 43% 45% -
College graduates 6% 4% -
Schooling level (Uncovered sector workers)
No High school 24% 14% -
High school dropouts 42% 40% -
High school graduates 31% 42% -
College graduates 2% 5% -
Joint labor sector choice
Husband’s/Wife’s sector
Covered/Covered - - 18%
Covered/Uncovered - - 8%
Covered/Home - - 40%
Uncovered/Covered - - 6%
Uncovered/Uncovered - - 5%
Uncovered/Home - - 17%
Home/Covered - - 1%
Home/Uncovered - - 1%
Home/Home - - 4%
Years worked in covered jobs
>75% of total number of years 60% 58% -
<25% of total number of years 20% 25% -
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Table B.16: Person-period observations by age group and birth cohort
Age of the Husband
Birth cohort 25 30 35 40 45 50 Total
1955 2,775 2,776 2,780 2,780 2,460 321 13,892
1965 3,282 3,280 3,280 2,888 411 0 13,141
1970 2,840 2,840 2,499 355 0 0 8,534
1975 2,402 2,160 307 0 0 0 4,869
1980 1,621 250 0 0 0 0 1,871
Total 12,920 11,306 8,866 6,023 2,871 321 42,307
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Table B.17: Changing the contribution rate
Policy Parameters
Contribution rate 5% 7.5% 10% 12.5% 15% 17.5% 20%
Welfare Pension
Level (monthly pesos) 48000 48000 48000 48000 48000 48000 48000
Taper rate (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Minimum Pension
Level (monthly pesos) 105000 105000 105000 105000 105000 105000 105000
Eligibility (yrs) 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Pension returns projection (%) 5.98 5.98 5.98 5.98 5.98 5.98 5.98
Outcomes
Husbands’ coverage
% covered 0.744 0.723 0.699 0.677 0.660 0.634 0.611
% uncovered 0.234 0.252 0.272 0.293 0.310 0.334 0.356
% inactive 0.022 0.024 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.0.31 0.032
% density under 75% 42.910 43.880 45.580 46.610 48.110 49.450 50.910
Wives’ coverage
% covered 0.334 0.327 0.303 0.276 0.260 0.246 0.237
% uncovered 0.101 0.111 0.125 0.136 0.150 0.151 0.157
% inactive 0.563 0.561 0.571 0.587 0.590 0.601 0.605
% lifetime density under 75% 85.740 85.760 86.440 86.480 86.570 86.780 86.380
Welfare Pension
% eligible husbands 4.010 3.960 3.620 3.620 4.100 4.100 4.480
% eligible wives 6.720 4.770 3.580 3.580 4.100 4.150 4.480
Projected liabilities* 903300 711650 439200 569450 655750 646250 709035
Minimum Pension
% eligible husbands 35.190 7.300 1.530 0.240 0.190 0.100 0.100
% eligible wives 21.220 9.540 4.430 1.570 0.860 0.520 0.380
Projected liabilities* 3905347 936585 216100 117100 80100 45450 36300
Mean Private savings
2004 Cross-section 8.307 7.290 7.040 6.637 6.390 6.166 5.920
Age profile
25 4.837 4.600 4.526 4.442 4.370 4.297 4.240
35 9.828 8.600 8.370 7.860 7.490 7.178 6.820
45 19.824 17.750 17.430 16.610 16.210 15.780 15.120
55 38.670 35.470 33.770 31.900 30.720 29.250 27.890
65 74.849 47.250 42.230 38.370 35.410 32.930 31.130
Mean Male Pension savings
2004 Cross-section 1.124 2.089 3.029 3.940 4.780 5.588 6.310
Age profile
25 0.191 0.587 0.804 1.014 1.220 1.409 1.589
35 0.986 2.350 3.400 4.407 5.340 6.249 7.069
45 2.674 6.010 8.758 11.400 13.860 16.240 18.400
55 5.708 12.890 18.868 24.000 30.020 35.160 39.860
65 9.173 20.790 30.520 40.020 48.790 57.190 64.870
Mean Female Pension savings
2004 Cross-section 0.316 0.522 0.713 0.886 1.060 1.212 1.370
Age profile
25 0.000 0.186 0.230 0.278 0.320 0.365 0.400
35 0.027 0.626 0.861 1.070 1.280 1.470 1.665
45 0.135 1.640 2.290 2.873 3.450 3.980 4.516
55 0.353 3.688 5.152 6.457 7.780 8.970 10.232
65 0.592 6.050 8.440 10.610 12.820 14.830 17.010
Mean Total savings
2004 Cross-section 9.748 9.901 10.782 11.463 12.230 12.966 13.600
Age profile
25 3.384 5.373 5.560 5.734 5.900 6.071 6.229
35 8.676 11.576 12.631 13.337 14.100 14.897 15.554
45 15.909 25.400 28.478 30.883 33.530 36.000 38.036
55 35.571 52.048 57.790 62.357 68.500 73.380 77.982
65 62.696 74.090 81.190 89.000 97.030 104.950 113.010
*Present value in 2004 of payments made to workers in the sample until their death, per capita
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Table B.18: Effect of an increase in the contribution rate on the distribution of
contribution densities
Contribution rate 10% 15% ∆
Husbands’ contribution densities
0-25% 20.1% 25.0% 4.9%
25-50% 11.0% 11.7% 0.8%
50-75% 14.6% 11.4% -3.2%
75-100% 54.3% 51.9% -2.5%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
Wives’ contribution densities
0-25% 66.5% 73.8% 7.3%
25-50% 12.6% 7.0% -5.6%
50-75% 7.7% 5.7% -2.0%
75-100% 13.2% 13.4% 0.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
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Table B.19: Effects of the 2008 Reform of the Minimum and Welfare Pension
Policy Parameters
Contribution rate 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Welfare Pension
Level (monthly pesos) 48000 75000 48000 75000 48000 75000
Taper rate (%) 100 30 100 30 100 30
Minimum Pension
Level (monthly pesos) 105000 - 105000 - 105000 -
Eligibility (yrs) 20 - 20 - 20 -
Pension returns projection (%) 5.98 5.98 2.94 2.94 9.94 9.94
Outcomes
Husbands’ coverage
% covered in 2004 69.9 70.1 69.9 70.1 63.4 70.1
% uncovered in 2004 27.2 26.7 27.2 26.7 33.4 26.7
% home in 2004 2.8 3.2 2.8 3.2 3.1 3.2
% density under 75% at age 64 45.6 46.7 43.6 44.9 49.5 54.3
Wives’ coverage
% covered in 2004 30.3 28.4 30.3 28.5 24.6 28.5
% uncovered in 2004 12.5 12.3 12.5 12.3 15.1 12.3
% home in 2004 57.1 59.2 57.2 59.3 60.1 59.3
% density under 75% 86.4 87.8 84.8 86.5 86.8 90.7
Welfare Pension
% eligible husbands 3.6 21.7 3.9 33.1 4.1 12.9
% eligible wives 3.6 21.7 5.0 33.1 4.1 12.9
Projected liabilities* 439200 4311260 734950 6432700 614625 2283800
Minimum Pension
% eligible husbands 1.5 - 10.8 - 0.1 -
% eligible wives 4.4 - 7.4 - 0.5 -
Projected liabilities* 216100 - 876370 - 45462 -
Mean Private savings
Sample mean in 2004 7.0 7.7 7.0 7.0 6.2 7.7
Age profile
25 4.5 4.7 4.5 4.7 4.3 4.7
35 8.4 9.3 8.3 9.2 7.2 9.3
45 17.4 19.1 17.0 18.9 15.7 19.5
55 33.8 34.6 34.6 35.3 29.2 32.8
65 42.2 40.0 47.7 44.9 32.9 29.3
Mean Male Pension savings
Sample mean in 2004 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.6 3.0
Age profile
25 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.4 0.8
35 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.2 6.2 3.7
45 8.8 8.8 7.1 7.1 16.2 11.9
55 18.9 18.9 12.5 12.5 29.3 34.1
65 30.5 30.6 17.7 17.6 57.2 66.9
Mean Female Pension savings
Sample mean in 2004 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.2 0.7
Age profile
25 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2
35 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.5 0.9
45 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.8 4.0 3.0
55 5.2 4.9 3.5 3.3 9.0 8.8
65 8.4 8.0 5.1 4.7 14.8 17.3
Mean Total savings
Sample mean in 2004 10.8 11.4 10.8 10.7 12.9 11.4
Age profile
25 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.7
35 12.6 13.5 12.3 13.2 14.8 13.9
45 28.5 30.1 26.0 27.8 35.9 34.4
55 57.8 58.4 50.5 51.1 67.4 75.6
65 81.2 78.5 70.5 67.2 104.9 113.5
*Present value in 2004 of payments made to workers in the sample until their death, per capita
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Table B.20: Effect of the 2008 reform on the coverage of Husbands, by age
% Covered
Age Baseline Reform ∆ %∆
20 65.4 65.5 0.2 0.3%
30 71.5 70.8 -0.7 -1.0%
40 69.6 68.9 -0.8 -1.1%
50 67.9 66.7 -1.2 -1.8%
60 51.7 46.9 -4.8 -9.3%
Table B.21: Effect of the 2008 reform on the coverage of Wives, by age
% Covered
Age Baseline Reform ∆ %∆
20 26.7 26.4 -0.3 -1.1%
30 29.0 28.1 -0.9 -3.1%
40 29.8 27.5 -2.2 -7.4%
50 23.5 20.3 -3.2 -13.6%
60 11.3 8.1 -3.2 -28.3%
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Appendix C
Figures
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Weighted Real Returns of the Chilean Pension Funds
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Figure C.1: Rentability of the Chilean Pension Funds 1981-2009
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Figure C.2: Probability of receiving a covered earnings offer (workers with 1 years
of covered experience)
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Figure C.3: Probability of receiving a covered earnings offer (workers with 15 years
of covered experience)
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